Ostinelli, Marcello (2009) I dilemmi morali e il significato del rincrescimento. In: Formen der Irrationalität - Formes d'irrationalité. Schwabe Verlag, Basel, pp. 149-158.
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Ostinelli. Dilemmi morali e rincrescimento. Studia phil. 2009.pdf - Published Version Download (91kB) |
Abstract
The paper argues for the plausibility of the thesis that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. In particular, I examine Bernard Williams’ objection that agent-regret in a situation of conflict among contradictory moral obligations would prove the existence of such dilemmas. Contrary to Williams’claim, agent-regret in these situations is not sufficient to establish the existence of such moral dilemmas. Williams’ argument cannot undermine the logical consistency of moral theories, nor their capacity to solve moral conflicts. I also consider Monika Betzler’s proposal that agent-regret can be considered ‘rational in a looser sense’ without implying an inconsistency in moral theory. In order to discuss the plausibility of this proposal, I focus on the interpretation of agent-regret as an emotional response which also restores offended moral integrity. I claim, in conclusion, that it is reasonable to assume this proposal, insofar as moral theory can determine some criteria of judgement which allow a distinction between authentic and false modalities of integration.
| Item Type: | Chapter in book |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Historical and philosophical studies > Philosophy > Moral philosophy |
| Department/unit: | Dipartimento formazione e apprendimento / Alta scuola pedagogica > Centro scuola e società |
| Depositing User: | Marcello Ostinelli |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Apr 2013 08:10 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Apr 2013 08:10 |
| URI: | http://repository.supsi.ch/id/eprint/2325 |
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