Rotondi, Valentina and Stanca, Luca (2015) The effect of particularism on corruption: Theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 51. pp. 219-235.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper investigates the role played by the cultural norms of particularism and universalism for collusive bribery. In our theoret- ical framework, the act of proposing or demanding a bribe violates a commonly held social norm, thus producing a psychological cost. By lowering this psychological cost, particularism increases the prob- ability of offering or asking for a bribe. We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25 countries from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal effect on the probability of offering a bribe, but no effect on the probability to be asked for a bribe. Overall, our findings indicate that policies aimed at favoring universalism may provide an effective tool in the fight against corruption.
| Item Type: | Scientific journal article, Newspaper article or Magazine article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Social studies > Economics |
| Department/unit: | Dipartimento economia aziendale, sanità e sociale > Centro competenze pratiche e politiche sanitarie |
| Depositing User: | Valentina Rotondi |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Nov 2020 12:27 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Oct 2023 10:00 |
| URI: | http://repository.supsi.ch/id/eprint/12117 |
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